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information between these interviews. Taking a memory test before being exposed to misinformation can
ironically increase the likelihood that an eyewitness would fall prey to the misinformation effect—a finding
termed Retrieval-Enhanced Suggestibility (RES). In this paper, we outline the motivation behind the original
research on RES, summarize the theoretical explanations that have been used to explain this finding, and
provide a review of the extant empirical findings. We then report the results of two new experiments that
examined whether participants, upon being informed that they had provided inconsistent responses during
the prior recall tests, could overcome the RES effect during a final recognition test in which the correct event
detail and the misinformation were offered as response options. The results showed that RES persisted in this
recognition test, and the level of inconsistencies shown by participants during the prior recall tests predicted
their final recognition performance, such that more inconsistent witnesses were also more error-prone during
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Abstract 
Eyewitnesses are often repeatedly interviewed about the same crime, and they might be exposed 
to misleading information between these interviews. Taking a memory test before being exposed 
to misinformation can ironically increase the likelihood that an eyewitness would fall prey to the 
misinformation effect – a finding termed Retrieval-Enhanced Suggestibility (RES). In this paper, 
we outline the motivation behind the original research on RES, summarize the theoretical 
explanations that have been used to explain this finding, and provide a review of the extant 
empirical findings. We then report the results of two new experiments that examined whether 
participants, upon being informed that they had provided inconsistent responses during the prior 
recall tests, could overcome the RES effect during a final recognition test in which the correct 
event detail and the misinformation were offered as response options. The results showed that 
RES persisted in this recognition test, and the level of inconsistencies shown by participants 
during the prior recall tests predicted their final recognition performance, such that more 
inconsistent witnesses were also more error-prone during the final recognition test – but this 
relation was stronger for misinformation-induced inconsistencies than for spontaneously-
produced inconsistencies. 
Keywords: misinformation; retrieval-enhanced suggestibility; delay; confidence; eyewitness 
inconsistency; recognition
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General Audience Summary 
Eyewitness memory is malleable and can be altered by misleading suggestions, and this 
misinformation effect can be exacerbated by a prior interview. Here, we provide a brief 
theoretical and empirical review of the literature on this retrieval-enhanced suggestibility effect; 
we then examined whether these misinformation-induced errors would persist after participant 
witnesses were warned that they had provided inconsistent answers to the same question 
previously. Our results indicate that the misinformation effect persisted despite this warning. We 
also examined whether inconsistent witnesses are also “bad” witnesses – a prevalent belief held 
by lay people, law enforcement officials, and judicial actors. When inconsistent responses were 
produced spontaneously, the level of inconsistency was a weak predictor of eyewitness memory 
accuracy. However, when inconsistent responses were induced by misinformation, the level of 
inconsistency strongly predicted eyewitness accuracy. These results show that not all eyewitness 
inconsistencies are created equal, and the importance of preventing witnesses from being 
exposed to misinformation. 
 
Word Count: 154  
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Retrieval-Enhanced Suggestibility: A Retrospective and a New Investigation 
Repeated interviews are a fact of life in the legal proceedings of a criminal trial. 
Witnesses may be questioned by officers at the crime scene and/or at the police station, by 
attorneys during interviews and deposition, and finally, while producing their testimony in court. 
Recent research has demonstrated the potentially negative consequences of conducting multiple 
interviews on the accuracy of eyewitness memory reports. In particular, witnesses are sometimes 
more susceptible to misinformation if their memory for the witnessed event had been tested prior 
to misinformation exposure. This retrieval-enhanced suggestibility (RES) effect is typically 
revealed in a four-phase procedure. In Phase 1, participants view a witnessed event, which is 
usually a video or a slideshow that depicts a crime. In Phase 2, participants either receive a 
memory test for that original event (i.e., retrieval practice) or not (i.e., control). In Phase 3, 
participants are exposed to some pieces of misinformation, which are usually embedded in a 
narrative that purportedly recapitulates the witnessed event. In Phase 4, participants' memory for 
the original event is assessed again in a final test. The surprising result is that participants who 
have completed the initial test are sometimes more likely to incorporate misinformation into their 
final memory reports than participants who have not completed the initial test (Chan, Thomas, & 
Bulevich, 2009). The RES effect is notable because a substantial body of research has 
demonstrated that retrieval practice enhances, rather than impairs, subsequent memory 
performance (Roediger & Butler, 2011). Therefore, conditions that violate this assumption are of 
important theoretical interests. 
In the following, we briefly describe the motivation behind the initial research on RES, 
the theoretical explanations that have been proposed to explain this counterintuitive result, and 
some of the more noteworthy empirical findings to date. We then present two experiments that 
investigate a new wrinkle in the research on eyewitness suggestibility in the context of RES – 
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i.e., whether the level of inconsistency in prior memory reports is indicative of subsequent 
eyewitness memory accuracy. 
Motivation Behind the Work that Led to the Discovery of RES  
In 2005, the first author (Chan) was conducting research that examined the beneficial 
effects of retrieval practice on later recall of both tested and nontested materials (Chan, 
McDermott, & Roediger, 2006), and Chan wondered if retrieval practice could be used as an 
intervention against the deleterious effects of misinformation for eyewitnesses. Chan had 
conducted a project on the misinformation effect as an undergraduate student (Lindsay, Allen, 
Chan, & Dahl, 2004), and felt that retrieval practice might be a “missing piece” in the traditional, 
three-phase misinformation design (which is similar to the four-phase design described above, 
but with the retrieval practice Phase 2 omitted). The logic was that upon viewing a crime, many 
eyewitnesses would recall details of the event soon after its occurrence. For example, one might 
briefly recall what happened to a 911 operator, provide a detailed statement to a police officer at 
the crime scene, or simply retell the event to a loved one. Due to the recency with which these 
recall “tests” occur after the witnessed event, they may help solidify one’s memory of the 
witnessed event before one is exposed to misleading information. Because having a stronger 
memory trace for the witnessed event should reduce one’s susceptibility to misinformation, the 
three-phase design, by virtue of omitting the initial “test,” may overestimate the influence of 
misinformation in many eyewitness situations (in which witnesses often recall the event prior to 
being exposed to misinformation). Based on this logic, Chan, together with Ayanna Thomas and 
John Bulevich, conducted the initial experiments that led to the discovery of RES – a result that 
was opposite to what the research team had predicted. Following the first experiment, Chan, 
Thomas, and Bulevich extended the results to older adults, and later completed an additional 
experiment that helped provide some much-needed theoretical analyses. This work ultimately 
culminated in a publication in Psychological Science (Chan et al., 2009). 
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Why Does Retrieval Exacerbate the Misinformation Effect?  
A comprehensive examination of the theoretical mechanisms that underlie RES is 
beyond of the scope of the present paper, but the “standard” explanation for RES includes two 
factors. The first, and most commonly supported explanation suggests that because retrieval 
practice can potentiate subsequent learning of new information (Chan, Davis, & Meissner, 2015; 
Pastotter & Bauml, 2014; Tulving & Watkins, 1974), prior testing may enhance participants’ 
ability to learn subsequently presented information – including misleading information. This 
enhanced learning of the misinformation is in turn manifested as heightened suggestibility (Chan 
et al., 2009; Chan & LaPaglia, 2011; Gordon & Thomas, 2014; Thomas, Bulevich, & Chan, 
2010). We refer to this explanation as the test-potentiated learning (TPL) idea. Although the 
exact mechanisms by which retrieval strengthens subsequent learning are not yet clear, 
researchers have proposed several explanations, including optimization of encoding strategies, 
reduction of inattention/mind wandering, isolation of encoding contexts, etc. (Chan et al., 2015; 
Chan & McDermott, 2007; Chan, Davis, & Meissner, 2017; Pastotter & Bauml, 2014; Szpunar, 
Khan, & Schacter, 2013; Thomas et al., 2010).  
The TPL explanation states that prior testing would strengthen encoding of the 
misinformation relative to control, thereby increasing its likelihood of being reported later. 
However, given that performing retrieval practice should also strengthen memories of the 
witnessed event, this benefit must be counteracted by the test-potentiated learning of the 
misinformation. Therefore, holding other factors constant (such as source monitoring and 
participants’ perceived accuracy of misinformation narrative), whether RES occurs or not should 
depend on the relative increase in strength between memories for the original event and the 
misinformation due to retrieval practice (see Figure 1 for an illustration). In general, this 
explanation suggests that because testing enhances learning of the misinformation, testing should 
increase recall probability of the misinformation relative to control. In tests that require 
participants to provide a single answer for a given question (e.g., cued recall), the heightened 
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response competition between the misinformation and the original event memories might also 
reduce recall probability of the original witnessed detail. However, in tests designed to minimize 
the influence of response competition such as modified-modified free recall (MMFR, in which 
participants can provide multiple answers to the same question) or free choice recognition, 
retrieval of the witnessed event detail should not be suppressed by the test-strengthened 
misinformation, because retrieval practice should enhance memories for both the witnessed event 
and the misinformation according to the TPL account. 
Another explanation for RES suggests that recalling details of a witnessed event makes these 
memories more susceptible to interference from misinformation. Based on this notion, 
encountering misinformation shortly after participants have attempted to recall a relevant 
witnessed event detail would make subsequent retrieval of that witnessed event detail more 
difficult, relative to a condition in which one encounters misinformation without recent retrieval 
(Chan & LaPaglia, 2013). The logic of this account stems from the memory reconsolidation 
model, which asserts that reactivating a consolidated memory can, under some circumstances 
(Exton-McGuinness, Lee, & Reichelt, 2015; R. S. Fernandez, Boccia, & Pedreira, 2016; 
Krawczyk, Fernandez, Pedreira, & Boccia, 2017; Lopez et al., 2016), temporarily increase its 
malleability (Agren, 2014; Ecker, 2015), thereby rendering it more susceptible to modification. It 
is important to note that this account provides a supplementary, but not sufficient, explanation for 
RES. In particular, this explanation is best invoked when the timing parameters of an RES 
procedure conform to the consolidation-reactivation-reconsolidation disruption framework. 
Specifically, for misinformation to disrupt reconsolidation of the original event memory, that 
memory should first be consolidated before it is reactivated, and the misinformation should be 
presented during the hypothetical reconsolidation period. Studies that are designed to properly 
test this account thus require a two- or three-phase procedure, in which retrieval practice of the 
original event occurred at least one day after its encoding (such that the original memory could 
consolidate), and the interfering (mis)information is presented shortly after this retrieval practice 
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(for a review of human declarative memory studies that satisfy these parameters, see Scully, 
Napper, & Hupbach, 2016). Consequently, studies that are conducted in a single experimental 
session do not provide a critical test of this account (Chan et al., 2009; Rindal, DeFranco, Rich, 
& Zaragoza, 2016). 
Lastly, another potential explanation for the RES effect is that retrieval enhances 
suggestibility because it increases misinformation acceptance (Belli, 1989), rather than 
producing actual changes to the underlying memory representations of the original event and the 
misinformation (Chan & LaPaglia, 2011; Rindal et al., 2016). The idea is that taking a prior 
memory test increases the likelihood that participants would treat the misinformation-embedded 
narrative as providing corrective feedback; that is, testing increases the perceived credibility of 
the misinformation. This account was most clearly articulated by Rindal and colleagues, 
although it has yet to be explicitly tested. Similar to the reconsolidation account, this notion may 
provide a supplementary, but insufficient, explanation for RES, given that memory tests that 
minimize the influence of misinformation acceptance (e.g., MMFR, source-free recognition test, 
narrative recall test, to be described in the empirical review to follow) still reveal RES. In 
addition, retrieval practice sometimes reduces, rather than increases, suggestibility (Gabbert, 
Hope, Fisher, & Jamieson, 2012; LaPaglia & Chan, 2012; Pansky & Tenenboim, 2011), a 
finding that should not occur if retrieval practice increases the likelihood for people to treat the 
misinformation narrative as corrective feedback. 
It is important to note here that the above explanations are not mutually exclusive, and they 
may all, under different circumstances, contribute to the occurrence/magnitude of RES. Again, 
among processes described by these explanations, test-potentiated learning of the misinformation 
is likely sufficient to produce RES, whereas reconsolidation disruption and test-enhanced 
misinformation acceptance might contribute to, or augment, the RES effect in some situations. 
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Some Notable Empirical Findings of RES 
Since its initial discovery, the RES effect has been demonstrated under a variety of 
experimental situations. In this section, we briefly review some of the major findings. For 
exposition purposes, we organize this literature review using the encoding, storage, and retrieval 
heuristic. 
Encoding variables. There are typically at least two encoding events in studies that 
examine the misinformation effect: one when participants encounter the initial witnessed event 
and another when participants encounter the materials through which misinformation is 
delivered. A variety of factors have been investigated, including variations in the length and 
modality of the witnessed event, the type of misinformation, the method of delivering 
misinformation, and the participant population. 
Modality of Witnessed Event. RES has been shown using a variety of materials, 
including video materials ranging from about 5 min (Wilford, Chan, & Tuhn, 2014) to 40 min in 
length (Chan et al., 2009). Researchers have also demonstrated RES using slideshows instead of 
videos (Rindal et al., 2016). In addition, two recent studies have shown RES-like effects using 
factual knowledge (Mullet, Umanath, & Marsh, 2014; Pashler, Kang, & Mozer, 2013), and 
another study reported an RES effect with word pairs (Weber, 2012). Despite these results, 
several studies have also revealed that retrieval practice can reduce the negative influence of 
misinformation (Gabbert et al., 2012; Huff, Davis, & Meade, 2013; LaPaglia & Chan, 2012; 
Pansky & Tenenboim, 2011). In Huff et al., the materials were six pictures (shown at a rate of 18 
sec) depicting scenes with various objects in it, and the participants were given supplementary 
(i.e., objects that were absent from the original pictures), rather than contradictory, 
misinformation. In LaPaglia and Chan, a 45-sec video depicted a theft, and the critical item 
concerned the appearance of the perpetrator (with the misinformation being that the perpetrator 
had a goatee). In Gabbert et al., the witnessed event was a roughly 2-min video of a bank 
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robbery, and participants were introduced to three pieces of misinformation. It is not yet clear 
why these studies demonstrated a benefit of retrieval practice rather than RES, but a common 
feature across these studies is that the witnessed event was quite short, and so the misinformation 
was also delivered via a short narrative. As will be described below, LaPaglia (2013; see also 
LaPaglia & Chan, 2013) showed that the way in which misinformation is presented can have a 
profound impact on whether prior testing would increase or decrease suggestibility. 
Types of Misinformation. Most studies presented misinformation that contradicted 
peripheral event details, and these studies typically showed a robust RES effect (e.g, Chan & 
LaPaglia, 2011; Gordon, Thomas, & Bulevich, 2015). However, Wilford et al. (2014) included 
misinformation for both central and peripheral details, and they found that RES was more likely 
to happen for peripheral details than for central details. The results regarding central details were 
somewhat ambiguous given the near ceiling accurate recall performance for these items. 
Nonetheless, these authors reported a small but significant RES effect for the central items when 
they combined their data across three experiments. More recently, Gordon and colleagues (2015) 
compared the RES effect for contradictory and supplementary misinformation, and they found 
RES for both, but the effect appeared to be larger for supplementary misinformation than for 
contradictory misinformation (see also Davis, Fernandez, & Chan, 2017).  
Methods of Delivering Misinformation. Chan and LaPaglia (2013) presented 
misinformation either in the context of the witness event (i.e., a terror attack) or in the context of 
an unrelated event (i.e., a drug bust), and they found an RES effect in only the former condition. 
LaPaglia and Chan (2013) presented misinformation in a narrative or in individual questions. 
Somewhat surprisingly, retrieval increased suggestibility when the misinformation was presented 
in a narrative, but it reduced suggestibility when the misinformation was presented via questions. 
Similarly, Pansky and Tenenboim (2011) showed a beneficial effect of retrieval practice when 
misinformation was embedded in questions (instead of a narrative). In addition, Memon and 
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colleagues (2010b) found a testing effect for forcibly fabricated misinformation following an 
initial Cognitive Interview. 
Why did a testing effect, instead of RES, occur in these aforementioned studies? One 
possibility, as alluded to previously, is related to the context under which misinformation is 
encoded. In a factorial design, LaPaglia (2013) investigated this issue by presenting 
misinformation in a narrative or in questions, but she also manipulated an additional variable – 
whether the misinformation was presented with or without contextual information. When 
misinformation was presented with contextual information, the sentences/questions that 
contained misinformation were embedded into a narrative that recapitulated the story of the 
witnessed event. When misinformation was presented without contextual information, the 
sentences/questions that contained misinformation were presented in an isolated manner, without 
being embedded in the story-like narrative of the witnessed event. Critically, LaPaglia found that 
it is the amount of contextual information, not whether the misinformation was delivered via 
questions or a narrative, that determined whether RES occurred. Specifically, RES occurred 
when misinformation was presented in the context of the witnessed event narrative, but not when 
misinformation was presented as individual facts/questions. According to LaPaglia, presenting 
misinformation in an isolated manner increased its distinctiveness relative to embedding 
misinformation in a narrative, and this distinctive processing “maximized” encoding of the 
misinformation regardless of whether participants were tested previously – thereby removing the 
ability for testing to potentiate misinformation encoding. When this logic is applied to 
understand the aforementioned studies that reported a testing effect (LaPaglia & Chan, 2012; 
Memon et al., 2010b; Pansky & Tenenboim, 2011), it highlights the critical commonality across 
these studies – that participants encoded the misinformation in a distinctive manner.  
Subject population. This is not strictly an encoding variable, but different subject 
populations (e.g., children, older adults) often encode materials differently. In one study (Chan et 
al., 2009), younger and older adults showed similar levels of RES for false recall of the 
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misinformation. In another study (LaPaglia, Wilford, Rivard, Chan, & Fisher, 2014), primarily 
Caucasian college students and primarily Hispanic college students demonstrated similar 
magnitudes of RES. Lastly, a recent study (Brackmann, Otgaar, Sauerland, & Howe, 2016) 
showed that children may be more susceptible to RES than young adults.  
Storage variables. Variation in the retention interval between encoding and retrieval is 
one of the most straightforward ways for researchers to directly target memory storage. The 
influence of retention interval on RES is complex, given that four major events exist in its 
design: a) witnessed event, b) retrieval practice, c) misinformation presentation, d) final test. The 
retention interval between any of these consecutive time points have been manipulated in various 
studies. 
Delay between witnessed event and retrieval practice. In most studies (e.g., Chan et al., 
2009), the delay is quite short (often immediate), although Chan and LaPaglia (2013) inserted a 
substantial (i.e., > 24 hr) delay before retrieval practice in two of their experiments (see also 
Experiment 2 in the present study, to be described later). Based on the results of these 
experiment, RES can occur regardless of whether retrieval practice is delayed or not. 
Delay between retrieval practice and misinformation presentation. This delay has been 
manipulated in a few studies. Although most studies presented the misinformation within 1 hr of 
the witnessed event, several studies showed that RES persisted when presentation of the 
misinformation was delayed by 24 hr to a week (Brackmann et al., 2016; Chan & Langley, 2011; 
Chan & LaPaglia, 2011). However, in a modified free choice recognition test in which the 
misinformation never appeared as a response candidate, Chan and LaPaglia (2013) showed that 
delaying the misinformation by 48 hr eliminated the RES effect for recognition memory of the 
witnessed event detail. Specifically, misinformation did not reduce the correct recognition rate 
regardless of whether participants had received an initial test. Although these findings appear 
inconsistent at first blush, a closer examination suggests otherwise. In Chan and Langley (and 
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also Chan & LaPaglia, 2011), the RES effect was apparent for misinformation production; 
however, similar to Chan and LaPaglia (2013), delayed presentation of the misinformation did 
not impair correct recall. These findings are consistent with the reconsolidation hypothesis, 
which suggests that only misinformation encountered shortly after retrieval interferes with 
reconsolidation of the witnessed event memory.  
Delay between misinformation and final test. Most studies used a short delay (within 30 
min), but reliable RES has also been reported when the final test occurred up to a week after 
participants were exposed to the misinformation (Chan & Langley, 2011; Chan & LaPaglia, 
2013). 
Retrieval variables. Several factors affect performance at the stage of retrieval. In the 
RES procedure, there are at least two retrieval events; the first is a retrieval practice/initial test 
phase that occurs before participants encounter misinformation, and the second is the final test, 
which occurs after participants encounter misinformation.  
Format of retrieval practice. Most studies used cued recall (i.e., participants were asked 
to recall a specific detail about the witnessed event) for the initial test, and these studies have 
typically demonstrated an RES effect. Several studies have examined the influence of prior 
retrieval on subsequent suggestibility using other types of initial test, and the evidence here is 
more mixed. For example, Wilford et al. (2014) reported RES with a free recall initial test, 
whereas LaPaglia et al. (2014) showed RES with a Cognitive Interview initial test. In contrast, 
Holliday (2003a; 2003b) did not find an RES effect following the Cognitive Interview, and 
Gabbert et al. (2012) showed a testing effect following the Self-Administered version of the 
Cognitive Interview. Conspicuously absent is recognition. To our knowledge, no studies to date 
has investigated whether an initial recognition test would exacerbate subsequent eyewitness 
suggestibility. 
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Format of the final test. A variety of final test types have been examined, with the most 
common being cued recall, where a robust RES effect has been reported across a number of 
studies (e.g., Chan et al., 2009; Gordon et al., 2015). Chan, Wilford, and Hughes (2012) and Huff 
et al. (2013) used source recognition as the final test. Here, the results are mixed, with the former 
reporting an RES effect and the latter reporting a testing effect. But because these studies also 
differed on other methodological variables (e.g., Chan et al. used video materials for the 
witnessed event, item cued recall for the initial test, and a narrative for the misinformation that 
purported recapped the video, whereas Huff et al. used individual slides of household scenes for 
the original event, category cued recall for the initial test, and delivered the misinformation via 
what was purported to be recall sheets from other participants), it is not possible to ascertain why 
they produced different results. In addition, the RES effect has been demonstrated when the final 
test was forced choice recognition (but see LaPaglia & Chan, 2012 who reported a testing effect 
with a lineup identification task; Thomas et al., 2010), MMFR (Chan et al., 2009; Chan & 
LaPaglia, 2011; Gordon & Thomas, 2014), and narrative recall (Gordon & Thomas, 2017 in this 
test, participants were asked to recall what they remembered from the narrative rather than from 
the witnessed event). Both Gabbert and colleagues (2012) and Wilford et al. (2014) used free 
recall as the final test; here, Gabbert et al. found a testing effect, but Wilford et al. reported an 
RES effect. Recently, Rindal and colleagues (2016) showed that the RES effect is absent in the 
modified two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) recognition test that required participants to 
choose between the correct answer and a new foil (but not the misinformation). 
Warning. A popular technique to reduce the misinformation effect is to issue a warning 
about the veracity of the materials through which misinformation is delivered (Blank & Launay, 
2014). To our knowledge, only one published study has examined the influence of a post-
misinformation warning on RES. Here, Thomas et al. (2010) showed that a warning at the time 
of the final test eliminated RES, regardless of whether the final test was cued recall or 2AFC 
forced choice recognition. 
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As the above review illustrates, RES is now a relatively well-established phenomenon. 
In the following, we describe two experiments that leveraged the RES paradigm to examine an 
important, but under-investigated, issue regarding eyewitness memory – whether inconsistencies 
in witness memory reports are indicative of inaccuracy.   
Investigating the Relation Between Eyewitness Inconsistency and Suggestibility in the 
Context of RES 
In the present study, we examined to what extent participant witnesses, when confronted 
with the idea that they had changed their responses across previous memory tests, were able to 
recover from their erroneous memory reports. Because eyewitnesses are often required to 
complete multiple interviews prior to their in-court appearance, concerns regarding the 
credibility of the witness accounts can arise when the witness changes his/her memory reports 
across interviews (e.g., when the witness recalls that the perpetrator was wearing a red shirt 
during one interview and then recalls that the perpetrator was wearing a gray shirt during a 
subsequent interview). Mock jurors judge inconsistent witnesses as less credible than consistent 
witnesses (Berman, Narby, & Cutler, 1995; Brewer & Burke, 2002; Pozzulo & Dempsey, 2009). 
Similarly, judges, lawyers, and police officers consider inconsistent witness as less credible 
according to survey studies (Fisher & Cutler, 1995; Strömwall, Strömwall, Granhag, & Granhag, 
2003). Indeed, a primary purpose of cross-examination, at least in practice, is to induce a witness 
to change his/her statements, thereby making the witness appear unreliable or perhaps even 
deceptive (Glissan, 1991). Although cross-examination is sometimes regarded as a powerful 
truth-seeking tool (Stevens, 1992; Wigmore, 1974), laboratory research has shown that, rather 
than serving its role as a safeguard for the truth, cross-examination is often detrimental to the 
accuracy of eyewitness accounts due to its adversarial nature (Zajac, O'Neill, & Hayne, 2012). 
For example, Valentine and Maras (2011) showed that prior to cross-examination, participants 
who had been exposed to misleading suggestions from a co-witness were less accurate than 
control participants (i.e., a misinformation effect). However, cross-examination eliminated the 
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difference in accuracy between the two groups, because the control participants’ accuracy had 
dropped to the level of the misled participants (see also Segovia, Strange, & Takarangi, 2015; 
Zajac & Hayne, 2003).  
Logically speaking, inconsistent responses should be less accurate than consistent ones. 
Although it is difficult to ascertain ground truth in criminal investigations, when a witness 
provides different answers to the same question across multiple occasions, it is likely that at least 
one of those answers is wrong. Of course, changes in memory reports can often be the result of 
an innocent mistake. For example, the eyewitness might have misunderstood a question during 
the prior interview, forgotten a previously remembered detail, or “recovered” a previously 
inaccessible memory (i.e., reminiscence). However, changes in memory reports can also occur 
because the witness is exposed to misinformation between interviews – which is what happens in 
the RES procedure. Given that misinformation can alter participants’ memory reports, it begs the 
question of whether participants can correct a previous mistake if given the chance to do so? 
Moreover, what role, if any, does prior testing have on participants’ ability to correct such 
mistakes? 
Despite the widespread beliefs that inconsistent witnesses are unreliable witnesses, and 
the well-known finding that misinformation can cause changes in witness memory reports, to our 
knowledge, no studies to date has examined whether misinformation-induced inconsistencies are 
predictive of eyewitness accuracy. Several studies, however, have examined the relation between 
witness inconsistency and accuracy in the absence of external influences such as misinformation. 
Among these studies, the general conclusion is that, surprisingly, consistency in memory reports 
is not a valid indicator of memory accuracy at the individual level. That is, witnesses who have 
provided fewer inconsistent responses across interviews are no more accurate than witnesses 
who have provided more inconsistent responses (Brewer, Potter, Fisher, Bond, & Luszcz, 1999; 
Fisher & Cutler, 1995; Fisher, Vrij, & Leins, 2013; Gilbert & Fisher, 2006). 
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The Present Experiments 
In the present study, we sought to answer three questions. First, to what extent is 
misinformation-induced memory inconsistency predictive of subsequent accuracy? Second, can 
participants overcome the negative influence of misinformation if they were told that they had 
provided inconsistent responses previously? Third, what role, if any, does initial testing have on 
the ability for participants to correct a former mistake? The RES methodology offers a unique 
opportunity to investigate misinformation-induced memory inconsistencies. Because participants 
are exposed to misinformation between repeated interviews in this procedure, it allows us to 
observe the relation between both spontaneous and misinformation-induced inconsistencies and 
subsequent eyewitness memory accuracy.    
The current experiments used a five-phase design (see Figure 2). During Phase 1, 
participants viewed a video of the target event. During Phase 2, participants either completed a 
cued recall test for the target event (the tested participants) or not (the control participants). 
During Phase 3, all participants listened to a postevent narrative that contained some misleading 
information. During Phase 4, all participants took a final cued recall test and then completed a 
series of distractor tasks for a total of 75 min. During Phase 5, participants received a 24-
question 2AFC recognition test. Each question in this test included the correct answer and a foil 
as response options. For the 12 items on which participants were misled, the foil matched the 
misinformation. All participants were given in-person, verbal instructions by the experimenter 
that the recognition test was their final memory test and that they needed to make sure that they 
pick the correct answer. In addition, the tested participants were also warned that they had 
sometimes given different answers to the same questions during the initial (Phase 2) and final 
(Phase 4) recall tests. These instructions were given to participants as an analogue of the type of 
questions that witnesses sometimes face when a prior inconsistency was identified (e.g., “you 
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told me different things about this on previous occasions, so which is it?”).1 We hypothesized 
that telling participants that they had provided inconsistent answers might serve as a warning, 
and participants might be able to use this warning to reduce the impact of misinformation. Post-
warning (i.e., warning provided to participants after they have encoded the misinformation, 
Blank & Launay, 2014) has been demonstrated to eliminate the RES effect (Thomas et al., 
2010). However, such targeted warnings (e.g., “we cannot verify the accuracy of the narrative”) 
are difficult to implement in real-world settings, because they require the person who administers 
the warning to know the source of the misinformation. Inconsistency-based warnings, however, 
do not suffer from this shortcoming, because one can issue these warnings without knowing 
whether the witness has been exposed to misinformation.  
Each experiment was conducted in two sessions scheduled one week apart. In 
Experiment 1, the one-week delay followed Phase 2 (i.e., the initial recall test for the tested 
participants, see the top half of Figure 2). In Experiment 2, the one-week delay followed Phase 1 
(i.e., immediately after the witnessed event, see the bottom half of Figure 2). The two 
experiments were otherwise identical. Note that in both experiments, all participants took the 
Phase 4 final recall test and the Phase 5 final recognition test at the same retention interval 
following the witnessed event. We selected these specific delays to provide a contrast between a 
situation in which initial testing should have a large (Experiment 1) or negligible (Experiment 2) 
benefit on retention of the witnessed event. Specifically, in Experiment 1, the initial test occurred 
                                                
 
1 We realize that our procedure (including both the instructions and the recognition 
test) did not provide a close approximation of the type of scenarios that actual witnesses may 
encounter in real-life. For example, eyewitnesses do not normally answer 2AFC recognition 
questions with the correct answer and a foil as response options. The purpose of the present 
paradigm was to examine participants’ memory accuracy after they have committed memory 
inconsistencies. 
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soon after encoding. Performing retrieval practice at this time should help preserve retention and 
slow forgetting of the target event details. In contrast, in Experiment 2, the initial test happened 
one-week after encoding, by which time forgetting should have already reached asymptote, and 
performing retrieval practice at this point would likely provide little to no benefit for retention of 
the witnessed event details (Spitzer, 1939). Altogether, the timing parameters of Experiment 1 
was expected to produce a situation in which retrieval practice would lead to a substantial gain 
for memories of the witnessed event memories relative to control (similar to the situation 
depicted in the right side of Figure 1), whereas the timing parameters of Experiment 2 should 
weaken, or perhaps eliminate, the ability for retrieval practice to enhance memories of the 
witnessed event relative to control (see the left side of Figure 1). Consequently, according to the 
TPL account, the RES effect should be smaller in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2. Moreover, 
given that a stronger benefit of testing should emerge in Experiment 1 than Experiment 2, we 
expect that the inconsistency-warning would also have a greater benefit in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 74 undergraduate students from a large Midwestern 
University who completed the experiment in exchange for course credit. The data for five 
participants were removed from final analysis because English was not their primary language. 
The data from an additional five participants were removed due to an experimenter error. 
Therefore, data from 64 participants were included in the final analyses. There were 33 
participants in the tested condition and 31 in the control condition.  
Materials and procedure. Participants consented to participate in a two-part study with 
Session 2 scheduled exactly one week after Session 1. Participants were tested in groups of up to 
eight while seated in front of computers separated by dividers. First, participants viewed a 43-
minute video depicting a terrorist plot (Chan et al., 2009). Next, participants in the control 
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condition were dismissed, whereas those in the tested condition took an immediate, 18-question 
cued recall test. Each question targeted a different critical detail (e.g., what did the terrorist use to 
knock out the flight attendant?). Participants were told to answer as many questions as possible 
while maximizing their accuracy, but they were not forced to produce a response. They had up to 
20 s to answer each question but could advance to the next question by pressing the "Enter” key. 
The tested participants were dismissed after they have completed this initial recall test. One week 
later, all participants returned and listened to an 8-minute narrative. The narrative presented a 
verbal summary of the witnessed event video. Six critical details were re-presented correctly in 
the narrative (e.g., the terrorist knocks the flight attendant unconscious with a hypodermic 
needle) – consistent items. Six critical details were not mentioned in the narrative (e.g., the 
terrorist knocks the flight attendant unconscious) – neutral items. Twelve critical details were 
presented incorrectly in the narrative (e.g., the terrorist knocks the flight attendant unconscious 
with a chloroform rag) – misled items. Among the 12 misled items, six were questioned during 
the initial recall test for the tested participants (misled-tested), and six were not questioned 
during the initial recall test (misled-nontested). Assignment of each detail to item type was 
counterbalanced across participants using three versions of the narrative. It is important to clarify 
here that the narratives were 1,115 words long on average, and we embedded the 12 pieces of 
incorrect details into each counterbalanced version of the narrative. Consequently, each 
participant listened to a narrative that presented mostly correct information, but with 12 pieces of 
misleading details. 
After the narrative, all participants took a 24-question cued recall test, with each 
question targeting one critical detail (they had up to 20 s to answer each question). Participants 
were instructed both verbally by the experimenter and through written instructions on the 
computer screen that they should answer the questions based on their memory of the video.  
After the final recall test, participants completed a series of distractor tasks for a total of 
75 min. First, they completed a 25 min comprehension test in which they read several short 
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passages and answered questions. Next, they completed the computerized operation span task 
and the reading span task (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005), and then they played the 
videogame Tetris for a total of 50 min.  
Lastly, participants were given 10 min to take a final 2AFC recognition test for all 24 
critical details. Each question included the correct answer and a foil as response options, and the 
identity of the foil matched the misinformation for the 12 misled items. After the 75 min 
distractor phase and just before this final recognition test, the experimenter re-entered the 
experiment room and told participants that they would now take a final memory test, and that 
they should “make sure that [they] pick the correct answer.” Participants were also asked to 
indicate their confidence for each question.2  The tested participants were given the following 
additional set of instructions: 
“When you were doing the comprehension task, I took a look at your data over 
the network and compared your answers from the first test you took a week ago 
with the test you took earlier today. I noticed that you sometimes gave different 
answers to the same question. This is normal and people often remember different 
things over time. In this next part of the experiment, I’d like you to take the test 
one last time. Unlike the previous tests, this will be a multiple choice test with 
two choices per question. I’d like you to make sure that you pick the correct 
                                                
 
2 After data collection was completed, we discovered that the experimenter provided partially 
inaccurate instructions regarding the confidence ratings. Specifically, although the experimenter 
indicated that participants were to provide confidence using a 0-10 confidence scale, the 
recognition test actually featured a 1-7 confidence scale. After answering each question, 
participants were asked to type a number between 1 and 7 to indicate their level of confidence, 
with the words “random guess” underneath 1 and “positive” under 7. Moreover, the computer 
would only accept an integer response in the 1 – 7 range. 
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answer. After answering each question, I’d also like you to indicate your 
confidence on your answer…”  
In reality, the experimenter never examined participants’ responses prior to giving these 
instructions. Importantly, across both experiments, all participants had changed their responses 
to at least one question – thus validating these instructions. Once participants finished the final 
recognition test, they were given a short survey on demographics, then debriefed and dismissed.  
Results 
Recalled details were coded into the categories of correct, misinformation (i.e., when 
participants responded to a question with the misinformation), other (i.e., when participants 
produced a response that neither matched the witnessed event detail nor the misinformation), and 
no answer (including responses similar to “I don’t know”). For both experiments, we first present 
results for the final recall test (Phase 4) and then the final recognition test (Phase 5). Lastly, we 
present results on the final recognition test depending on whether participants had previously 
provided inconsistent responses to the same questions – these results are, of course, only 
available for the tested participants (because they were the only participants tested twice prior to 
the final recognition test). For the sake of completeness, results for the initial (Phase 2) recall test 
are shown in Table 1, but they will not be discussed further. 
Final recall performance. All recall probabilities are shown in Table 2. Because of the 
vast number of item and response combinations available, we conducted only theoretically-
motivated planned comparisons. In particular, we examined the influence of initial testing (i.e., 
tested participants vs. control participants) on subsequent correct and misinformation recall 
probabilities. For correct recall, we examined the effects of initial testing for both the neutral 
items and the misled items. For misinformation recall, we examined the effects of initial testing 
for only the misled items (because only these items were contradicted by misinformation, and 
participants rarely spontaneously produce an incorrect answer that matched the misinformation 
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for neutral items). Unless otherwise noted, misled items referred to the average performance of 
the 12 misled items for the control participants and the six misled-tested items for the tested 
participants. We considered data for the six misled-nontested items when examining whether 
prior testing increased eyewitness suggestibility to only items that appeared on the initial test? 
The major results are shown in the left side of Figure 3. For correct recall, a 2(between-
subjects: tested participants vs. control participants) X 2(within-subjects: neutral items vs. misled 
items) ANOVA yielded significant main effects for initial testing, F(1, 62) = 28.71, p < .01, ηp2 
= .32, item type, F(1, 62) = 37.37, p < .01, ηp2 = .38 , and the interaction between these variables, 
F(1, 62) = 4.12, p = .05, ηp2 = .06. The main effects showed that, overall, the tested participants 
(M = .33) outperformed the control participants (M = .15) – i.e., there was a testing effect; 
moreover, participants were more likely to recall the correct event details for neutral items (M = 
.33) than for misled items (M = .15) – i.e., there was a misinformation effect. Perhaps more 
importantly, the interaction showed that presentation of the misinformation reduced the 
beneficial effects of testing by about half. Without misinformation (i.e., neutral items), 
participants who completed the immediate recall test were far more likely to recall the correct 
details one week later (M = .45) than the control participants (M = .22). This beneficial effect of 
testing was substantially reduced for details that were contradicted by misinformation; however, 
the tested participants (M = .21) still outperformed their control counterparts (M = .09). Another 
interpretation of this interaction is that the misinformation effect, as estimated by the reduction 
of correct recall probability between the neutral and misled items, was exacerbated by initial 
testing. Specifically, the reduction in correct recall due to misinformation was .13 (d = .51) for 
the nontested participants, but .24 for the tested participants (d = 1.01). It is important to note 
that this interaction must be interpreted with caution. Because control participants’ correct recall 
rate for the neutral items were closer to floor level (M = .21), misinformation would likely have 
less influence on these participants than on the tested participants. 
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For misinformation recall, an independent samples t-test showed that the between-
subjects RES effect was not significant, t(62) = 1.07, p = .29, d = 0.27, even though the tested 
participants (M = .55) were slightly more likely to recall the misinformation than the control 
participants (M = .49). Next, we compared the proportion of misinformation recall between items 
that did (Mmisled-tested = .55) and did not (Mmisled-nontested = .51) appear during the initial test for the 
tested participants. Here, too, the influence of RES at a within-subjects level was not significant, 
t(32) = 0.77, p = .44, d = 0.14. Overall, as we had predicted, Experiment 1 demonstrated that 
retrieval practice, when implemented soon after the occurrence of a witness event, can enhance 
delayed eyewitness memory performance (as shown by the higher correct recall rate for the 
tested participants relative to the control participants). However, despite this advantage, testing 
did not inoculate eyewitnesses from the negative impact of misinformation. 
Final recognition accuracy and confidence. Similar to how we analyzed the final 
recall results, a 2 (between-subjects: tested vs. control) X 2 (within-subjects: neutral vs. misled) 
ANOVA for correct recognition showed a powerful main effect for item type, F(1, 62) = 110.00, 
p < .01, ηp2 = .64, but neither the main effect of initial testing nor the interaction was significant, 
Fs < 1.94, ps > .16 (see the left side of Figure 4 for means). The main effect of item type 
indicates a misinformation effect – participants were far more likely to choose the correct option 
in the 2AFC test for a neutral item (M = .78) than for a misled item (M = .39). Planned 
comparisons showed that initial testing did not affect accurate recognition for either neutral items 
(Mcontrol = .76, Mtested = .79) or misled items (Mcontrol = .35, Mtested = .42), both ts < 1.21, ps > .23. 
These results are notable for two reasons. First, for the neutral items, initial testing produced 
almost no benefits for accurate recognition even though it had a substantial benefit for recall, a 
pattern that replicates previous research (e.g., Chan & McDermott, 2007; Jones & Roediger, 
1995). Second, prior to conducting this experiment, we believe that telling the tested participants 
that they had produced inconsistent responses during previous tests might serve as a warning, 
and that participants might leverage the benefits of initial testing to overcome the negative 
RETRIEVAL-ENHANCED SUGGESTIBILITY  25 
influence of misinformation or RES (cf., Thomas, Bulevich, & Chan, 2010). The present data, 
however, showed that recent exposure to misinformation had an overwhelming influence on 
recognition of a week-old witnessed event, regardless of whether participants had received 
retrieval practice or not. 
We now present results regarding participants’ confidence in the final recognition test. 
Here, we examined the mean confidence associated with recognition of the correct detail and the 
misinformation in a 2(between-subjects: tested vs. control) X 2(within-subjects: neutral vs. 
misled) X 2(within-subjects: chose the correct option vs. chose the misinformation) ANOVA 
(see the left side of Figure 5). Both within-subject variables produced a main effect, Fs > 27.59, 
ps < .01, ηp2s > .39. The main effect of item type indicates that participants provided higher 
confidence ratings for misled items (M = 5.65) than for neutral items (M = 4.54), whereas the 
main effect of response type shows that participants provided higher confidence ratings when 
they chose the correct detail (M = 5.51) than when they chose the misinformation (M = 4.69). 
Perhaps most importantly, item type interacted with response type, F(1, 42) = 10.13, p < .01, ηp2 
= .19. This interaction showed that, for neutral items, incorrect responses (i.e., when participants 
chose the foil) were associated with lower confidence ratings (M = 3.87) than correct responses 
(M = 5.21) – i.e., confidence was, on average, diagnostic of accuracy. However, for misled items, 
this difference was eliminated, such that participants provided similar confidence ratings for both 
correct (M = 5.81) and incorrect responses (i.e., when they chose the misinformation instead of 
the correct answer, M = 5.50). No other main effects or interactions were significant. Hence, for 
both the tested participants and their control counterparts, presentation of the misinformation 
eliminated the diagnosticity of confidence ratings. 
Relation between response inconsistency and final recognition performance. We 
now examine whether the level of response inconsistencies was predictive of performance on the 
final recognition test. To achieve this, we examine the proportion of neutral and misled questions 
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for which participants had provided different responses between the initial and final recall tests.3 
As expected, participants were less likely to provide inconsistent responses for neutral items (M 
= .41) than for misled items (M = .68), t(32) = 6.17, p < .01, d = 1.07. More importantly, we 
examined whether participants who changed their responses more frequently were also more 
likely to succumb to misinformation during the final recognition test — after they were informed 
that they had provided inconsistent responses previously. Here, we examined the correlation 
between the proportion of questions with inconsistent responses and the participant’s final 
recognition accuracy. Specifically, response inconsistency for neutral items (between the initial 
and final recall test) was predictive of final recognition accuracy for these items, r = -.39, p = 
.02, see the top left quadrant of Figure 6. Similarly, response inconsistency for misled items was 
also predictive of final recognition accuracy for these items, r = -.46, p < .01, see the top right 
quadrant of Figure 6. Both of these negative correlations indicate that the less consistent 
participants were also more likely to select the incorrect response during the final recognition 
test.  
The above data illustrate the relation between response inconsistency and final 
recognition accuracy at the individual/participant level. We also examined this relation at the 
item level. Specifically, was final recognition performance dependent upon whether participants 
had provided consistent vs. inconsistent responses for that item previously? A 2(neutral items, 
misled items) X 2(consistent, inconsistent) within-subjects ANOVA showed that both main 
effects and the interaction were significant, Fs > 21.24, ps < .01, ηp2s > .41. The interaction 
                                                
 
3 For this analysis, we considered a response as having changed if the participant provided 
meaningfully different responses across the two recall tests. Minor wording differences in 
answers such as “she was using a computer” and “she was on the computer” were not considered 
inconsistent responses.  
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indicates that final recognition accuracy was substantially lower for misled items that had 
elicited inconsistent responses (M = .26) than those that had elicited consistent responses (M = 
.77), t(31) = 7.16, p < .01, d = 1.27. This pattern, however, was far more muted for the neutral 
items. Here, recognition accuracy for items that had elicited inconsistent responses (M = .73) was 
still lower than the items that elicited consistent responses (M = .86), t(31) = 2.24, p = .03, d = 
0.39, but the difference was much smaller than that exhibited by the misled items. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 66 undergraduate students from a large Midwestern 
University who completed the experiment in exchange for course credit. Data from six 
participants were excluded from analyses because English was not their primary language. 
Therefore, data from 60 participants was used in the final analyses, with 29 participants in the 
control condition and 31 in the tested condition.   
Materials and procedure. All materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 1 
except that participants were dismissed for one week after they watched the target video. After 
this retention interval, participants in the tested condition took the first cued recall test before 
they listened to the audio narrative, whereas participants in the control condition listened to the 
narrative immediately upon their return (see bottom of Figure 2). The verbal instructions that 
were given to the tested participants just before the final recognition test was adapted to match 
the scheduling of Experiment 2. 
Results 
Final recall performance. The main findings of interest are shown on the right side of 
Figure 3. For correct recall, a 2(tested vs. control) X 2(neutral vs. misled) ANOVA revealed a 
marginally significant main effect for initial testing, F(1, 58) = 3.69, p < .06, ηp2 = .06. Unlike 
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Experiment 1, when initial testing increased correct recall, the marginal main effect of testing 
here was driven by a reduction in correct recall for the tested participants (M = .13) relative to 
the control participants (M = 17). Indeed, as we had predicted, delaying initial testing by a week 
eliminated the beneficial effects of retrieval practice on even the neutral items, (Mtested = .19 and 
Mcontrol = .20), t < 1. There was also a significant main effect for item type, F(1, 58) = 9.81, p < 
.01, ηp2 = .15. Unsurprisingly, misinformation reduced the likelihood of correct recall (Mmisled = 
.10 and Mneutral = .19). The interaction between initial testing and item type was not significant, 
F(1, 58) = 1.15, p = .29, ηp2 = .02.  
Data for misinformation recall showed a powerful between-subjects RES effect, t(58) = 
7.00, p < .01, d = 1.81, with the tested participants recalling the misinformation at an alarming 
rate (M = .70) relative to the control participants (M = .39). Moreover, among the tested 
participants, the misinformation recall rate was higher for items questioned on the initial test 
(Mmisled-tested = .70) than for items omitted from the initial test (Mmisled-nontested = .61), t(30) = 2.32, 
p = .03, d = 0.42 — a within-subjects RES effect. Lastly, initial testing appeared to have 
increased participants’ susceptibility to misinformation as a whole, as the tested participants 
were also more likely to recall misinformation for previously nontested details (Mmisled-nontested = 
.61) relative to the control participants (M = .39), t(58) = 5.10, p < .01, d = 1.32. Altogether, 
these results demonstrate that RES might not be confined to just the event details that were 
explicitly tested (see also Gordon & Thomas, 2014; Wilford et al., 2014).  
Final recognition accuracy and confidence. A 2(tested vs. control) X 2(neutral vs. 
misled) mixed ANOVA for the probability of final correct recognition yielded no main effect for 
initial testing, F(1, 58) = 1.08, p = .30, a main effect for item type, F(1, 58) = 103.55, p < .01, ηp2 
= .64, and most importantly, a crossover interaction between these variables (see the right side of 
Figure 3), F(1, 58) = 22.58, p < .01, ηp2 = .28. Unlike the results from the final recall test (in 
which initial testing failed to boost correct recall for either neutral or misled items), initial testing 
— even after a one-week delay — increased correct recognition of the neutral items (Mcontrol 
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participants = .61, Mtested participants = .73), t(58) = 2.09, p = .04, d = 0.54, but it reduced correct 
recognition for the misled items (Mcontrol participants = .43, Mtested participants = .24), t(58) = 4.54, p < 
.01, d = 1.17. In other words, the tested participants were far more likely to choose the 
misinformation instead of the correct detail in a forced-choice test than the control participants, 
even after the tested participants were told that they had provided inconsistent responses 
previously. 
We now examine the confidence associated with participants’ recognition responses. 
Similar to Experiment 1, we conducted a 2(tested vs. control participants) X 2(neutral vs. misled 
items) X 2(correct vs. misinformation recognition) mixed ANOVA (see the right side of Figure 
4). There was a main effect of item type, F(1, 40) = 14.21, p < .01, ηp2 = .26, such that 
participants provided higher confidence for the misled items (M = 5.32) than for the neutral items 
(M = 4.75) — a pattern that replicated the results from Experiment 1. The interaction between 
item type and response type was also significant, F(1, 40) = 33.34, p < .01, ηp2 = .46. Similar to 
Experiment 1, confidence ratings were diagnostic of accuracy for the neutral items, such that 
participants provided lower confidence ratings for incorrect responses (M = 4.33) than for correct 
responses (M = 5.18). However, the opposite pattern occurred for the misled items, such that 
participants indicated higher confidence for incorrect responses (M = 5.87) than for correct 
responses (M = 4.77). Perhaps most importantly, the three-way interaction was significant, F(1, 
40) = 9.59, p < .01, ηp2 = .19. Specifically, confidence results for the control participants 
mirrored the pattern exhibited in Experiment 1, such that confidence ratings were diagnostic of 
accuracy for the neutral items (Mcorrect = 5.04, Mfoil = 4.35) but not for the misled items (Mcorrect = 
5.10, Mfoil = 5.31). However, a pronounced, crossover pattern emerged for the tested participants. 
Whereas correct responses for neutral items were associated with higher confidence than 
incorrect responses (Mcorrect = 5.31, Mfoil = 4.30), the opposite was true for misled items (Mcorrect = 
4.44, Mfoil = 6.43). Therefore, not only did initial testing increased the likelihood that participants 
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would select the incorrect, misleading alternative in the forced choice recognition test, it also 
increased the confidence associated with these incorrect responses. 
Relation between response inconsistency and final recognition performance. We 
now turn to results regarding response inconsistencies. As expected, participants were far more 
likely to change their answers across the recall tests for misled items (M = .77) than for neutral 
items (M = .43), t(30) = 8.96, p < .01, d = 1.61. Moreover, similar to the results of Experiment 1, 
the level of response inconsistency for the misled items was predictive of final recognition 
accuracy for these items (see the right side of Figure 5), r = -.61, p < .01. However, unlike 
Experiment 1, the same correlation was not significant for the neutral items, r = -.23, p = .22.  
To examine the relation between response inconsistency and final recognition 
performance at the item level, we conducted a 2(neutral items, misled items) X 2(consistent, 
inconsistent) within-subjects ANOVA. The results of this analysis were consistent with those in 
Experiment 1, with both the main effects and the interaction reaching significance, Fs > 6.83, ps 
< .02, ηp2s > .23. Critically, the interaction shows that, once again, participants were much less 
likely to choose the correct response alternative during the final recognition test for the misled 
items that had previously elicited inconsistent responses (M = .15) than those that had elicited 
consistent responses (M = .50), t(22) = 4.04, p < .01, d = 0.84, but this difference was virtually 
absent for the neutral items (Minconsistent = .76, Mconsistent = .75), t(30) = 0.96, p = .82, d = 0.04.  
General Discussions 
In two experiments, participants were exposed to misinformation a week after they 
viewed the witnessed event. Half of the participants in Experiment 1 completed their initial 
“interview” immediately after the witnessed event, whereas half of the participants in 
Experiment 2 completed their initial “interview” a week after the witnessed event. As predicted, 
a substantial memorial benefit of testing was observed in Experiment 1 – for event details that 
were not contradicted by misinformation. This benefit of testing was reduced considerably for 
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misled items – although it was still reliable. Notably, prior retrieval did not significantly increase 
reporting of misinformation in the final recall test of Experiment 1, although it also did not 
reduce reporting of the misinformation (i.e., no RES effect for misinformation recall was found). 
The results in Experiment 2, however, differed dramatically from those in Experiment 1. Not 
only did initial testing fail to increase correct recall of the neutral items, it increased reporting of 
misinformation for the misled items in the final recall test – i.e., an RES effect.  
In the present experiments, participants also took a final 2AFC recognition test, and 
prior to this test, the tested participants were informed explicitly that they had provided different 
answers to the same question previously. We reasoned that this warning might help participants 
to overcome the influence of RES when they were given an extra, final opportunity to answer 
questions about the witnessed event – during which the correct answer was provided as one of 
the response options. Clearly, our data do not support this hypothesis. We now consider some of 
the more noteworthy findings across these two experiments. 
 In Experiment 1, although the immediate initial test significantly boosted accurate 
recall of the neutral items during the recall test one week later, it did not increase correct 
recognition of these items. However, in Experiment 2, although the delayed initial test did not 
increase accurate recall of the neutral items, it did enhance accurate recognition of these items. If 
this finding is replicable, then it shows that even delayed initial testing might, under some 
circumstances, benefit subsequent memory performance. Given the novel and unexpected nature 
of this finding, any attempts at providing an explanation would be necessarily speculative. 
Nonetheless, we highlight this result here because it may prove a fruitful avenue for future 
investigation.  
Perhaps most importantly, 2AFC recognition performance of the misled items mirrored 
those from the final recall test. Therefore, the same pattern of results persisted from the final 
recall test to the final recognition test, thus demonstrating that participants were unable to 
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overcome the influence of RES with the inconsistencies warning. This finding is somewhat 
surprising when compared to the results from another warning study (Thomas et al., 2010), 
which showed that warning subjects that the postevent narrative may contain inaccuracies 
eliminated the RES effect. There are several differences between the implementation of warnings 
in the present study relative to the Thomas et al. study, and any of these differences could have 
contributed to the different results. First, Thomas et al. used a targeted warning that informed 
participants that the narrative might contain misinformation (a warning that would be difficult to 
implement in real-life), whereas the inconsistencies warning used here did not explicitly inform 
subjects of potential inaccuracies in the postevent narrative. Second, in Thomas et al., the 
warning was delivered just before the second/final recall test; however, in the present 
experiments, the inconsistencies warning was delivered after participants had completed the 
second/final recall test, but before the final recognition test. This difference is important, as the 
final recall test gave participants an opportunity to commit the misinformation-induced errors 
before the warning was issued (Schreiber & Sergent, 1998). Lastly, Thomas et al. conducted 
their experiment in a single experimental session, but the current experiments had a one-week 
interval between presentation of the witnessed event and the final test.  
A potential concern with the current experimental design is that we did not include a 
condition in which the tested participants were not given the inconsistencies warning. It is 
therefore possible that the inconsistencies warning was beneficial, and that the tested participants 
would have performed even worse on the final recognition test had they not been given this 
warning. In other words, without this condition, we do not know if the inconsistency warning 
was ineffective at reducing false recognition, or if the warning was indeed effective, but the 
current experiment simply lacked the necessary baseline condition to detect the benefits of such a 
warning. However, a closer examination of the recognition performance in Experiment 2 
suggests that the latter possibility is unlikely, given that the tested participants selected the 
misinformation 76% of the time and provided near-ceiling level of confidence for these errors. It 
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is hard to imagine that participants could have done much worse from a suggestibility 
perspective. 
Our results show that committing a misinformation-induced error had a relatively long-
lasting consequence on memory (e.g., Schooler, Foster, & Loftus, 1988). Furthermore, when 
participants chose the misinformation option during the final recognition test, they provided 
confidence ratings that were comparable to (or exceeded) those for the correct option. These 
results highlight the fact that not all mistakes are created equal –although spontaneous memory 
errors (i.e., when participants picked the misinformation option for a neutral item) were 
associated with lower confidence than accurate responses (see also Wixted, Mickes, Clark, 
Gronlund, & Roediger, 2015), misinformation-induced errors were not. In our opinion, given 
that it is often difficult to know whether and to what misinformation an eyewitness might have 
been exposed (and thus difficult to tell whether an inconsistent response might have been driven 
by misinformation), it remains risky to use eyewitness confidence as an indicator of accuracy 
overall (Fox & Walters, 1986; Penrod & Cutler, 1995; Shaw, McClure, & Dykstra, 2007), and 
even more so when court/police records indicate that a witness might have been exposed to 
misinformation (“Prosecutors Appeal Overturned Conviction of ‘Making a Murderer’ Subject 
Brendan Dassey,” n.d.). 
A major interest of this study was to examine the relation between response 
inconsistencies and subsequent memory accuracy. As stated previously, the RES methodology 
provides a suitable environment to investigate this question, because participants are exposed to 
multiple “interviews” and are exposed to misinformation for some of the witnessed details. At 
the item level, it is perhaps not surprising that participants would exhibit poorer recognition 
performance for the items that had elicited inconsistent responses than those that had elicited 
consistent responses – participants might have provided inconsistent responses for a particular 
item because they had a weak memory for that item. Therefore, this finding may simply reflect 
an item-selection artifact. More important, however, was that the relation between response 
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inconsistency and later recognition accuracy differed depending on item type, such that 
participants were far more likely to err during the final recognition test for the misled items than 
the neutral items, even when we confined the analysis to only items that had elicited inconsistent 
responses (Mneutral = .75 vs. Mmisled = .21 averaged across the two experiments). The difference 
between spontaneous response inconsistencies (i.e., inconsistent responses for neutral items) and 
misinformation-induced response inconsistencies was also evident at the individual level. Here 
too, we found that response inconsistencies predicted accuracy during the final recognition test, 
but the association was stronger when the inconsistent responses were misinformation-driven 
rather than spontaneous (at least in Experiment 2). Together, these results show that not all 
memory errors are created equal.  
The general public, including actors of the judiciary, believe that inconsistent witnesses 
are unreliable. Despite the importance and prevalence of this belief, scant empirical research has 
examined whether this assumption is justified, and the existing studies painted a picture whereby 
the relation between response inconsistencies and accuracy was weak at best. The present 
research, however, shows that the relation between inconsistency and accuracy can be quite 
strong – particularly for inconsistencies induced by misinformation. When combining the data 
across the two experiments, spontaneous inconsistencies (i.e., when participants provide 
inconsistent responses to a neutral item) was moderately predictive of final recognition accuracy 
for these items, accounting for roughly 10% of its variance, r = -.31, F(1, 62) = 6.70, p = .01. 
However, the predictive power for misinformation-induced inconsistencies for final recognition 
of these items was much stronger, accounting for roughly 30% of its variance, r = -.55, F(1, 62) 
= 26.92, p < .01.  
Previously, Chan and LaPaglia (2011) argued that, theoretically, it is important to 
distinguish systematic from nonsystematic eyewitness errors because the former can be 
manipulated by system actors (e.g., an officer might knowingly introduce misinformation to 
obtain a conviction) and might be associated with greater confidence than the latter (Chan et al., 
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2012). In the present study, we further showed that these two types of errors, in the form of 
response inconsistencies, also held different predictive powers for subsequent memory accuracy. 
Distinguishing systematic from nonsystematic errors is straightforward in experimental settings, 
where the researcher can control the introduction of misinformation. However, in the real-world, 
it is often difficult to know if an eyewitness had been exposed to misinformation, let alone 
knowing whether particular inconsistent witness statements were influenced by misinformation. 
Therefore, the applied value of the current findings does not rest on the possibility of identifying 
the source of a memory inconsistency after witnesses have been exposed to misinformation; 
rather, these results emphasize the critical importance of preventing the unintentional 
introduction of misinformation by investigators (e.g., by training investigators to use interview 
techniques designed to minimize contamination, such as the Cognitive Interview, Fisher & 
Geiselman, 1992; R. E. Holliday, 2003b; Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010a).  
Concluding Remarks 
Under many circumstances, retrieval practice is a powerful memory enhancer. Not only 
does retrieval strengthens subsequent recall of the tested information (Roediger & Butler, 2011), 
it also potentiates later learning of new information (Pastotter & Bauml, 2014). Research on the 
RES effect, however, has highlighted some conditions under which prior retrieval can be 
detrimental to memory performance, and theoretical work in this literature has shown that the 
very mechanisms by which retrieval strengthens new learning might also contribute to RES. In 
the current study, we used the RES paradigm to examine whether eyewitness inconsistencies are 
indicative of accuracy, and we found that the answer to this question depends partly on whether 
the inconsistencies were evoked by external influences.  
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Table 1 
Initial Recall Test Performance for Experiments 1 and 2 
 
 Response type 
 Correct  Misinformation  Other No answer 
Experiment 1 .49 (.12) .06 (.05) .36 (.14) .08 (.12) 
Experiment 2 .19 (.10) .09 (.08) .54 (.16) .18 (.20) 
     
Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Differentiation of item types (i.e., 
consistent, neutral, misled) occurred when participants listened to the audio narratives (and after 
the initial recall test). Therefore, we presented the data here collapsed across response types. 
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Table 2. 
 
Final Recall Performance as a Function of Initial Testing Condition, Item Type, and Response 
Type 
 
 Response type 
 Correct Misinformation Other No answer 
Experiment 1 
Tested participants     
Consistent items .72 (.18) .02 (.06) .23 (.18) .03 (.08) 
Neutral items .45 (.21) .07 (.11) .41 (.19) .07 (.14) 
Misled-tested items .21 (.17) .55 (.22) .21 (.18) .04 (.07) 
Misled-nontested items  .12 (.16) .51 (.25) .31 (.24) .07 (.12) 
Control participants     
Consistent items .61 (.26) .04 (.09) .27 (.21) .08 (.15) 
Neutral items .22 (.22) .05 (.09) .58 (.22) .16 (.20) 
Misled-nontested items  .09 (.09) .49 (.21) .32 (.16) .10 (.11) 
Experiment 2     
Tested participants     
Consistent items .78 (.17) .03 (.06) .15 (.15) .04 (.10) 
Neutral items .18 (.14) .09 (.11) .56 (.24) .17 (.21) 
Misled-tested items .06 (.09) .70 (.18) .19 (.14) .04 (.09) 
Misled-nontested items  .10 (.14) .61 (.16) .23 (.16) .06 (.10) 
Control participants     
Consistent items .55 (.22) .06 (.12) .30 (.20) .10 (.16) 
Neutral items .20 (.20) .09 (.10) .54 (.27) .17 (.21) 
Misled-nontested items  .14 (.13) .39 (.16) .34 (.16) .12 (.13) 
     
Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.   
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Figure 1. Relation between the memory strengthening effects of retrieval practice and whether 
RES is predicted by the test-potentiated learning (TPL) account. The left half of the figure 
illustrates a situation whereby retrieval practice enhances memory of the witnessed event to a 
smaller extent than it does for memory of the misinformation. According to the TPL account, 
RES should occur in this situation. The right half of the figure illustrates the opposite situation, 
whereby retrieval practice enhances memory for the witnessed event more than it does for 
memory of the misinformation, and RES should not occur in this situation according to the TPL 
account. 
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Figure 2. Design for Experiments 1 and 2. 
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Figure 3. Correct and misinformation recall probabilities for neutral and misled items in the final recall test. Misinformation recall 
refers erroneous responses whereby participants responded to a question with the misinformation. Error bars display descriptive .95 
CI. 
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Figure 4. Correct recognition probabilities for neutral and misled items in the final 2AFC recognition test. Error bars display 
descriptive .95 CI. 
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Figure 5. Confidence associated with correct and misinformation recognition in the final 2AFC recognition test. Confidence ratings 
ranged from 1 – 7. Error bars display descriptive .95 CI. 
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Figure 6. Relation between response inconsistency (during initial and final recall) and accuracy 
during final recognition.  
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